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AGRC Framework / Domain 8
08
SOC 2 CC6 (Logical Access), ISO 27001 A.8 (Asset Management), EU AI Act (Provenance).
Domain Objective
Securing the cloud infrastructure perfectly is futile if highly privileged agents are accessed via porous, unmanaged mobile devices. A malicious third-party app with root access can silently read an Agent's context window on the screen and exfiltrate the data without triggering server-side alarms. This domain secures the collapse of the perimeter where the digital agent interfaces with the human operator, enforcing Hardware-Rooted Trust and Endpoint Containerization.
Controls
END-8.1
Mandatory Containerization & MDM Prerequisite
The Rule — Control Statement
Any mobile device or endpoint accessing enterprise environments must be enrolled in Mobile Device Management (MDM) enforcing strict logical data containerization.
The Why — Fiduciary Rationale
Deploying highly capable agentic software to a porous Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) fleet invites catastrophic data leakage. The enterprise must control the workspace the agent operates within.
The How — Implementation Standard
Access must be hard-blocked on unmanaged, rooted, or jailbroken devices. Containerization (e.g., Android Enterprise Work Profile, iOS User Enrolment) must be strictly enforced to isolate corporate data from personal applications.
The Proof — Continuous Attestation Evidence
Conditional Access policies and Identity Provider (IdP) logs proving that 100% of successful authentications to the agent interface originated from MDM-compliant, non-rooted device postures.
END-8.2
Cross-App Agentic Isolation (Screen-Scraping Defense)
The Rule — Control Statement
The corporate endpoint container shall actively block OS-level accessibility tools and data-sharing mechanisms while the agent session is active.
The Why — Fiduciary Rationale
Malicious third-party apps utilizing local on-device AI or accessibility features can execute "Screen-Scraping," silently reading the enterprise data and capturing sensitive workflows.
The How — Implementation Standard
The Mobile Application Management (MAM) profile must restrict clipboard sharing (copy/paste restrictions), disable background screen recording/casting, and block unvetted accessibility services from interacting with the agent UI.
The Proof — Continuous Attestation Evidence
MAM configuration exports demonstrating the active enforcement of screen-capture denial and cross-profile clipboard isolation for any business applications.
END-8.3
Dynamic Zero-Trust Endpoint Posture Checking
The Rule — Control Statement
Agentic workflows shall continuously authenticate the security health of the endpoint device, independently of the human user's identity.
The Why — Fiduciary Rationale
An authorized user operating a device with a deactivated EDR agent or unpatched CVEs represents a compromised terminal. High-level execution tools must not be accessible from a vulnerable host.
The How — Implementation Standard
If the endpoint posture degrades mid-session, the orchestration layer must dynamically downgrade the agent's capability to "Read-Only" (Tier 1), physically stripping the agent of its execution tools until device health is restored.
The Proof — Continuous Attestation Evidence
Telemetry linking Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) health signals to dynamic, real-time IAM privilege downgrades within active agent sessions.
END-8.4
Session Token Hardware Binding
The Rule — Control Statement
Access tokens governing an active agentic workflow must be cryptographically bound to the endpoint's physical hardware enclave.
The Why — Fiduciary Rationale
Prevents session hijacking malware (e.g., info-stealers) from extracting an active session token and replaying it from a remote attacker's machine to hijack the agent's workflow.
The How — Implementation Standard
Tokens must be tied to the hardware root of trust (e.g., Apple Secure Enclave, Android Titan M, Windows TPM 2.0). If the token is intercepted and replayed from a different MAC address or hardware footprint, the Agent must instantly self-terminate.
The Proof — Continuous Attestation Evidence
Identity Gateway configurations enforcing Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC) and logs demonstrating automated session termination upon hardware-signature mismatch.
END-8.5
Cryptographic Content Provenance (Anti-Deception Mandate)
The Rule — Control Statement
All outputs generated by the agent (text, audio, images, code, documents) must be injected with imperceptible, cryptographically signed metadata proving Non-Human generation.
The Why — Fiduciary Rationale
Superficial "Generated by AI" UI banners are "Attestation Theater"—trivially scraped or ignored. Regulations require mathematically irrefutable proof that content was machine-generated to prevent synthetic deception.
The How — Implementation Standard
The Governor must embed an immutable Provenance Header (e.g., C2PA standards or SynthID digital watermarking) into the payload, mathematically proving the content was generated by a specific, governed NHI.
The Proof — Continuous Attestation Evidence
Automated audits of egress payloads confirming the successful embedding of cryptographically valid C2PA/SynthID signatures prior to network transmission.
END-8.6
Disclosure Tamper-Resistance
The Rule — Control Statement
The orchestration layer shall structurally prevent the agent from modifying, hallucinating around, or removing its own cryptographic disclosure headers.
The Why — Fiduciary Rationale
Highly capable agents, when tasked with outward-facing communications (e.g., marketing or customer service), may attempt to "hack" their way out of identifying themselves as machines to increase their persuasive effectiveness.
The How — Implementation Standard
The cryptographic disclosure must be applied at the Governor layer after the agent's generation phase but before network egress, completely out of reach of the LLM's mutable context window.
The Proof — Continuous Attestation Evidence
Architectural data-flow diagrams and pipeline telemetry proving the provenance injection step occurs strictly downstream of the LLM inference execution environment.
END-8.7
Provenance Verification at the UI Layer
The Rule — Control Statement
The enterprise endpoint software (apps, browser extensions, or clients) shall actively and visually authenticate the cryptographic provenance of incoming agentic communications.
The Why — Fiduciary Rationale
Protects the human operator from "Man-in-the-Middle" attacks or "Shadow AI" instances attempting to masquerade as the governed corporate agent.
The How — Implementation Standard
If an agent's output is missing its cryptographic watermark—indicating interception or alteration—the UI client must actively flag the text as "Unverified/Untrusted" to the human operator.
The Proof — Continuous Attestation Evidence
Front-end Quality Assurance (QA) testing artifacts proving the UI successfully detects, flags, and warns users regarding payloads with stripped or invalid C2PA signatures.
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